Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Non-unanimous juries are fundamentally different and less deliberative than the Sixth Amendment requires. Non-unanimous juries also fundamentally skew the decision of whether to exercise the jury trial right. The pernicious racial origins of the non-unanimity rule further undermine the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Like Gideon v. Wainwright (the only case the Supreme Court has recognized as falling within Teague v. Lane’s watershed rule exception), Ramos v. Louisiana is a watershed rule and therefore, under Teague v. Lane, applies retroactivity to cases on collateral federal review.  Ramos, like Gideon, overturned a badly flawed, errant precedent to restore a bedrock Sixth Amendment right.  Ramos, like Gideon also increases the accuracy of convictions, when accuracy is properly understood to refer to the fairness of the process and the likelihood that the defendant received procedural protections guaranteed by the Constitution, rather than the likelihood that actual guilt or innocence is determined.

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and FAMM in Support of Defendant/Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Appellee Raia’s Petition for Rehearing addresses the discretion of a district court to excuse the 30-day waiting period for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). On April 2, 2020, the Panel declined to remand this case under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1, stating that remand would be “futile.” In so ruling, the Panel necessarily concluded that the 30-day waiting period cannot be excused or waived. That conclusion was inconsistent with both Supreme Court and Circuit precedent. The ruling creates inconsistency in the Circuit’s treatment of all claims-processing rules, and undermines courts’ equitable authority in a wide range of cases. The30-day waiting period is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. Courts may excuse noncompliance with that rule absent an express prohibition on doing so. Remand is therefore not “futile.” The Panel’s sua sponte conclusion to the contrary was error. Rehearing should be granted to correct the Panel’s error and confirm that judges are empowered to address “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances even when they arise exigently. At a minimum, the Panel should grant rehearing and order full briefing on this important issue, which was neither decided below nor fully briefed on appeal.

Brief of Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Due Process Institute, R Street Institute, and Americans for Prosperity Foundation in Support of Defendant/Cross-Appellee.

Argument: The text of §403(b) applies the sentencing amendments to §924(c) at resentencing. The text of §403(b), not the savings statute, governs application of the sentencing amendments. Background principles confirm that §403 applies at resentencing. The government’s rule serves no purpose. The government’s contrary arguments fail. Congress enacted the First Step Act to reform §924(c). In accordance with the text, context, and purpose of the First Step Act, this Court should hold that the sentencing amendments in §403 apply to sentences imposed after the First Step Act’s effective date, including at a de novo resentencing.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent-Appellant Facebook.

Argument: This Court should grant direct appellate review in this case because the public interest in preserving work product protection and attorney-client privilege is of such importance that justice requires a final determination by this Court. In compelling Facebook to produce information generated in the course of an attorney-led investigation, the Superior Court failed to properly apply the work product and attorney-client privilege protections that attached to those materials. The work product doctrine protects from disclosure information generated in the course of an attorney-led investigation that is conducted “because of” anticipated litigation, and an attorney’s sorting of information during a privileged investigation cannot be discoverable by his adversary. And the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients even if the client publicly discloses the existence of an attorney-led investigation. In rejecting these principles, the Superior Court created dangerous uncertainty in the attorney-client relationship.

Brief of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Center for Legal and Evidence-Based Practices in Support of Appellant Julio Cesar Ortega Campoverde.

Argument: Mr. Ortega Campoverde is challenging the terms of his immigration detention, which include a bond he cannot afford that was set without considering his ability to pay. He argues that the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act require immigration judges in bond hearings to consider both an immigrant detainee’s ability to pay and alternative conditions of release. The amicus brief reviews evidence from the criminal pretrial system to demonstrate that nonmonetary alternatives to detention successfully address the goals of assuring a defendant’s appearance in court and protecting public safety, without overburdening individual liberty. It also reviews the ways in which detention impairs case outcomes, and long-term outcomes for individuals, unrelated to the merits.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (in support of petition for rehearing en banc).

Argument: In Lohmeyer, the IRS issued a John Doe summons for the names of all of the clients of the Lohmeyer firm who had sought legal advice concerning off shore tax shelters. The Amicus takes the position that the purpose for which such clients seek legal advice is privileged and thus the identity of those clients who sought the advice is privileged because it would reveal their motive for seeing legal advice.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner. 

Argument: The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that a person violates the CFAA by using a computer to access information for an improper purpose, even if otherwise authorized to access that information.  This reading goes beyond the CFAA’s text, fails to account for Congress’ intent in enacting it, and flouts the rule of lenity, which requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in a defendant’s favor.  The decision below also interpreted the CFAA in a manner that raises due process concerns, both because it is an unconstitutionally vague reading of the statute and because it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires that Petitioner’s reading of the statute prevail.  Further, an expansive reading of the CFAA would contribute to the trend of overcriminalization and give courts and prosecutors a backdoor method of updating criminal laws in response to changed technological—or potentially cultural, economic, or political—realities, something our constitutional structure reserves for Congress.

Brief of National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, Immigrant Legal Resource Center, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Immigration Clinic, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Washington Defender Association, Brooklyn Defender Services, Bronx Defenders, and Immigrant Defense Project as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees and Cross-Appellants Gerardo Gonzalez, et al.

Argument: ICE’s use of immigration detainers violates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against arbitrary detention and its requirement that a person in government custody receive a prompt, neutral determination of probable cause for their arrest. ICE issues immigration detainers to local law enforcement without any neutral or even individualized probable cause determination, but based merely on the automated review of computerized databases that are incomplete and inaccurate. The subjects of these detainers are frequently held for at least 48 hours after they are otherwise eligible for release, even though most are not even taken into ICE custody. Those taken into ICE custody are frequently denied bond and remain in detention for additional weeks, months, or even years before an immigration judge rules on their removal proceedings, without any neutral review of probable cause supporting their arrest. ICE detainers also result in a wide range of negative collateral consequences even separate and apart from lengthy detention. Because ICE detainers have repercussions indistinguishable from criminal proceedings in which prompt, neutral review of probable cause is required, they must be subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections under Gerstein.

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Argument: Plaintiffs allege systemic deficiencies in Idaho’s provision of public defense services and seek prospective relief. The court is addressing the proper standard to apply to plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate that Idaho’s public defense system presents a substantial risk of harm to members of the plaintiff class. The types of harm that can result from the systemic deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs include overly high bail, unnecessary or overlong pretrial detention, unwarranted guilty pleas leading to negative collateral consequences, lack of time and resources to prepare defenses, wrongful convictions, and economic and social costs to society as a whole. 

Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Defendant.

Argument: The criminal justice system is a system of plea negotiations that gives prosecutors enormous leverage over criminal defendants. Defendants face a higher sentence if they go to trial, which drives many defendants to take a plea bargain. This “trial penalty” means that some innocent defendants plead guilty. Defendants who plead guilty while maintaining their innocence should not be subject to a sanction of criminal contempt for doing so. Prosecutors may have wholly laudable reasons to dismiss cases even after a plea, and courts should not chill such actions with the threat of a contempt sanction.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender, and Mississippi Public Defenders Association In Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The Supreme Court has held that life without parole is appropriate only for a “permanently incorrigible” juvenile offender.  States like Mississippi that do not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility are not reliably implementing that command because offenders receive life-without-parole sentences even if they are capable of change.  Mississippi’s approach also produces arbitrary sentencing outcomes, because a juvenile’s sentence depends on whether his sentencer independently comprehends Miller, not on whether he is actually permanently incorrigible.  States that require a finding of permanent incorrigibility ensure that juvenile offenders only receive life-without-parole sentences when the sentence is proportionate and lawful.  Sentencers can still impose life-without-parole sentences when an offender is actually permanently incorrigible. 

Brief of the National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant.

Argument: Tennessee’s sentencing statute for first-degree murder, which mandatorily imposes a minimum 51-year term of prison confinement on a juvenile, without consideration of the teenager’s youth and immaturity or other mitigating circumstances, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses and other provisions of the federal and state constitutions. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 460 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that, in light of contemporary understanding of adolescent psychology and brain development, it is unconstitutional to mandatorily deprive a juvenile offender of “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Because a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 51 years exceeds the expected life-span of offenders sentenced at a young age, it does not provide young offenders with the “meaningful opportunity” for release contemplated by the Supreme Court of the United States. A majority of state court decisions from outside Tennessee have held that term-of-years sentences of over fifty years do not provide young offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release. Further, after Miller and Montgomery, numerous state legislatures have enacted juvenile sentencing and parole procedures allowing juveniles the opportunity for parole within a much shorter time period.

Memorandum of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Vermont.

Argument: The COVID-19 pandemic is of unprecedented national and global significance, necessitating a drastic local response. The rate of infection in the Vermont DOC is striking in comparison both to the rate of infection in Vermont as a whole, and even compared to the highest rate of infection for any state in the country. The Department of Corrections is demonstrably ill-equipped to adequately respond to the pandemic, and the Court must intervene to protect the constitutional rights of those incarcerated. The Court should join with judges from other jurisdictions across the country, who have reviewed inmate motions and petitions similar to those that are currently before this Court, and who have taken steps to reduce incarceration by releasing inmates on bail in light of this unprecedented pandemic and the conditions of confinement issues it brings to light.

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Plaintiff

Argument: Texas Governor Greg Abbot’s Executive Order GA-13 of March 29, 2020 seeks to order that Texas judges may not release persons to personal bonds where the person has previously been convicted of a crime that involves physical violence or the threat of physical violence or of a person currently arrested for such a crime; that is supported by probable cause. Leaving aside the vague terms of this executive order, it encroaches on the function of the courts to determine whether persons should be released on personal bond, whether they should be released on electronic monitoring, or should be released on a cash or surety bond with conditions. It does not prohibit release of this same class of described persons on cash or surety bail. Therefore, it appears to place restrictions for release on the poor over those for those of greater means without any rational relationship to a distinguishing important governmental purpose. Thus, those previously convicted of the defined crimes or currently charged with those crimes can obtain release; while those without the economic means to post a cash or surety bail cannot obtain release. Under the circumstances presented by the COVID 19 pandemic and the Texas Criminal justice system, GA 13 violates the separation of powers, interferes with judicial independence, violates equal protection and due process of law, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for those who cannot afford cash or surety bail who otherwise qualify for release on personal bond.