Written Statement of Norman L. Reimer, Executive Director National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Over-Criminalization Task Force Re: “Mens Rea: The Need for a Meaningful Intent Requirement in Federal Criminal Law”

U.S. District Court Judge Emmet G. Sullivan’s letter to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure, regarding federal disclosure obligations and suggesting an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Coalition letter to Governor Greg Abbott, of Texas, regarding his executive order (GA-13) refusing to allow release of inmates from state detention facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

NACDL President Nina J. Ginsberg's written statement to the Washington, D.C. City Council Judiciary and Public Safety Committee regarding proposed legislation to prohibit "panic" defenses in criminal cases.

Brief of the National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Delegate Patrick A. Hope as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for Appeal.

Argument: The Circuit Court Violated Virginia law and due process by allowing the Commonwealth to expert-shop and admitting only its second, illegally obtained expert opinion. The Circuit Court violated Virginia law and due process by arbitrarily precluding Mr. Baughman from presenting testimony by Dr. Gravers and Dr. Krueger in his defense at trial.

The Due Process Protections Act of 2020 amends the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure to require federal district judges to enter an order in each case confirming prosecutors' obligation to disclose evidence exculpatory to the defense under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and its progeny, and setting forth consequences for failing to do so. In response to this new law, NACDL's Discovery Reform Task Force drafted and promulgated a Model Standing Discovery Order Pursuant to the Due Process Protections Act.

Coalition letter to House leadership and the House Judiciary Committee regarding the proposal for judges to reaffirm the requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence as presented in the Due Process Protections Act (S. 1380, 2020), as already passed by the Senate.

In The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois County Department, Criminal Division: People of the State of Illinois v. Church, Chase & Betterly

Memorandum of Law in Support of Joint Motion to Dismiss The Consitutionally Vague Terrorism Charges in The Indictment

Argument: DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS ONE, TWO, THREE, AND SIX OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED INDICTMENT WHICH ARE BASED UPON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF “TERRORISM” AND “TERRORIST ACT” 

Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Randell G. Shelton, Jr., Reversal, and Remand.

Argument: This case involves an important question of criminal law: Under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, what is the appropriate remedy when a government agent acts in shocking bad faith, intentionally “wiping” his government-issued, undercover laptop computer instead of delivering it for a forensic evaluation as instructed? The Court below found that the agent acted in bad faith and violated Appellant’s due process rights, but nevertheless fashioned a remedy short of dismissal. The remedy given by the Court wasn’t nearly sufficient to (a) satisfy the defendant’s right to seek and discover potentially exculpatory evidence; (b) punish the government for wrongful conduct in this case, or (c) deter wrongful conduct in future cases by similarly situated government agents or entities. This issue strikes at the heart of the due process guarantee and the fairness of the justice system. Dismissal is the only remedy that will appropriately redress the government’s acts of bad faith and violations of Appellant’s due process rights.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The question presented is of great importance to criminal defendants. The ability to present evidence in one’s defense is a fundamental right accorded to criminal defendants by the Constitution. It is not merely a means of ensuring that trials are generally fair; rather, it stands alongside the right to confront witnesses and the right to counsel of one’s choosing as essential elements of a fair trial, the violation of which is necessarily unconstitutional. The defense’s ability to present favorable evidence is critical to our adversarial system.  The question presented by this petition arises in a diverse range of circumstances during criminal proceedings and is frequently recurring, warranting the courts attention.