Filter Results

Keywords
Active Filters
X Plea bargaining
Filter by Topic
Jurisdiction
Filter by Content Type
Filter by Champion Column

Showing 1 - 15 of 23 results

    • Brief

    Oregon v. Aranda

    Brief of the Oregon Criminal Defense Lawyers Association and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Respondent.


    Argument: If OEC 609 is construed to permit all felony convictions without weighing the risk of unfair prejudice, the rule violates federal due process. The indiscriminate admission of even unfairly prejudicial convictions runs counter to common law traditions that require “fundamental fairness” and generally bar the use of propensity evidence.

    Barring the use of OEC 403 prior to admitting felony convictions also burdens the exercise of Oregon defendants’ constitutional trial rights. First, it forces defendants to choose between the right to the right to testify and an impartial jury. Relatedly, the per se admission of prior felony convictions against defendants tends to produce a chilling effect on the right to testify because if they take the stand, they will be unfairly prejudiced. The Supreme Court has made clear, “[t]he right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial . . . is one of the rights that ‘are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.’” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US 44, 51, 107 S Ct 2704, 97 L Ed 2d 37 (1987) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 US 806, 817, n 15, 95 S Ct 2525, 45 L Ed 2d 562 (1975)). Second, the threat of per se prior conviction impeachment also impermissibly burdens the right to trial because it both distorts the strength of the government’s case and adds to the coercive nature of the plea-bargaining system of criminal adjudication.

    • Brief

    South Carolina v. Robinson

    Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner.


    Argument: Kenneth Robinson’s case is a quintessential example of why people plead guilty under the threat of a trial tax. Kenneth withstood the immense pressure to plead guilty. A child of only fifteen, charged with murder under the “hand of one, hand of all” doctrine, he exercised his right to a jury trial, foregoing a twenty-three-year offer to plea to manslaughter. He refused to relinquish his right to appeal, foregoing a thirty-year plea offer following guilty verdicts at trial. He paid the price. Most defendants plead guilty to avoid the trial tax; Kenneth went to trial, and the trial tax was levied against him in the form of a fifty-year sentence. By contrast, Kenneth’s co-defendants pleaded guilty and received significantly shorter sentences. NACDL is uniquely positioned to observe the criminal justice system. Over time, based on empirical data and the experiences of its members, NACDL has developed an understanding of the trial tax—the reality that individuals who choose to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to trial face exponentially higher sentences if they invoke the right to trial and lose. It is NACDL’s position that the trial tax is antithetical to the American concept of justice because it diminishes jury trials, undermines the legal system’s goal of truth-seeking, relieves the government of its burden of proof, contributes to wrongful convictions, and disproportionately hurts young people. Kenneth Robinson’s case in particular starkly reveals the dangers to a defendant who chooses to exercise his constitutional right to trial.