Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Inc., National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Rutherford Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent.

Argument: NACDL’s amicus brief argues that in the sentencing phase of his capital trial, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev sought to introduce evidence in mitigation that his older brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev had previously enlisted an accomplice to commit a brutal triple murder and robbery on the ten-year anniversary of September 11, 2001. Tamerlan bound, beat, and slit the throats of three men (one a childhood friend) in the name of jihad.  This evidence supported Dzhokhar’s core mitigation theory that his older brother was a violent jihadist who influenced him to participate in the Boston Marathon bombings and was more culpable for those crimes. But the district court excluded it. Tamerlan’s previous jihadist murders and recruitment of an accomplice are powerful pieces of mitigation evidence, and 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) provides no basis to exclude them. “Waste of time” is not a basis for exclusion under Section 3593(c). The proposed mitigation evidence created no danger of “confusing the issues.” Section 3595(a)’s harmless error standard is demanding, and the Government fails to meet it here. The Government fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury was just as likely to disbelieve Dzhokar’s core mitigation theory if it had seen the Waltham evidence.  The Government also fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have sentenced Dzhokhar to death even if it believed Dzhokhar acted under Tamerlan’s influence.

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The Double Jeopardy Clause allows successive prosecutions by different governments only if each of them exercises sovereignty in two different aspects. When a prosecution in a CFR court (Court of Indian Offences) is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government’s control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Due Process Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari). 

Argument: Without addressing the relevant text or history, the Eleventh Circuit held that, for purposes of the COA statute, a “proceeding under section 2255” extends beyond identifying a defect in custody—habeas’s historic outer limit—to also include the process of choosing an appropriate remedy. The court of appeals erred by reading the jurisdictional limits in the Antiterror-ism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) in isolation from—rather than in pari materia with—the jurisdictional grants that they were enacted to restrain. Read together, sections 2255 and 2253 communicate Congress’s unambiguous intent that a “proceeding under section 2255” has the same scope as a traditional proceeding for habeas corpus. This Court’s habeas precedents, in turn, make clear that the scope of that proceeding does not include selecting a remedy. review is warranted because requiring a Certificate of Appealability prior to appellate review of a choice of remedy under § 2255(b) would be the functional equivalent of abolishing review altogether. COAs are available only for constitutional claims, but the choice of post-conviction remedy is an almost purely statutory procedure, and, as a practical matter, no COA could ever issue to a defendant in petitioner’s position. This Court’s review is needed to resolve that split and correct the Eleventh Circuit’s misinterpretation of the statutes governing federal post-conviction review.

Brief of FAMM, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Trial judges must consider a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct and intervening legal developments when exercising their Section 404 authority to “Impose A Reduced Sentence.” Evidence of post-sentencing conduct and intervening changes in law significantly affects district courts’ exercise of Section 404 sentencing discretion—producing fairer and more appropriate sentences. The text and statutory context of the First Step Act compel consideration of post-sentencing conduct and intervening legal developments.

Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brennan Center for Justice, Center for Democracy & Technology, Electronic Privacy Information Center, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: The capabilities of video surveillance have increased significantly, just as the costs of such surveillance have decreased, counseling in favor of certiorari. Certiorari is necessary to make clear the Fourth Amendment prohibits the long-term warrantless monitoring and video recording of all activity immediately outside a person’s home.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Criminal Procedure Professors in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: In Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee, 751 F.3d 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the distinctions among the exigent circumstances doctrine, the emergency aid doctrine, and the community caretaking doctrine “are not always clear.” In turn, these fuzzy distinctions have led to a “lack of clarity in judicial articulation and application of the three doctrines.” This lack of clarity means that courts deciding whether the community caretaking doctrine should apply to warrantless home entries often think that doctrine is needed to justify entries that are already covered by the exigent circumstances doctrine and/or the emergency aid doctrine. As set forth in this amici brief, this Court’s opinions defining and applying the exigent circumstances and emergency aid doctrines establish that police officers would need to rely on the community caretaking doctrine as an independent justification for warrantless home entries in only two potential situations: to address (1) non-bodily harms such as nuisances; and (2) non-imminent threats of bodily harm. Framed in that fashion, it is clear that a separate and independent rationale such as “community caretaking” – which was generated by the special circumstances attendant to automobile searches – does not justify invasion of the sanctity of the home. Indeed, the way that this Court distinguished its opinion in Coolidge in creating the community caretaking doctrine makes clear that the doctrine does not and should not apply to warrantless home entries. In addition, the capacity for a “community caretaking” exception that permits warrantless searches of the home would invite its use as an end run around the protections of the warrant requirement.

Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers In Support Of Petitioner (on petitioner for a writ of certiorari).

Argument: Timely resolution of the question presented is of great practical importance to First Step Act movants. Appellate-court decisions remanding for considers of the § 3553(a) factors have resulted in significantly reduced sentences. The temporal gap between the original sentencing and First Step Act proceeedings underscores the importance of an update § 3553(a) analysis. In light of the very real possibility that renewed § 3553(a) consideration results in lower sentences, the Court must intervene now.

Brief of National, State, and Local Civil Rights, Racial Justice, and Criminal Defense Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner. 

Argument: The Court should adopt a rule that individuals seized during criminal proceedings in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights need only show that the criminal case terminated in their favor in order to proceed with a Section 1983 action to redress the constitutional violation.

Brief of National, State, and Local Civil Rights, Racial Justice, and Criminal Defense Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (on petition for a writ of certiorari).

Argument: This case asks whether an individual seized during criminal proceedings in violation of the Fourth Amendment must prove that the criminal proceedings ended in a manner indicative of their innocence in order to succeed in a section 1983 action to redress the violation of their constitutional rights. A majority of lower courts have wrongly decided that a termination demonstrating innocence is an element of such constitutional claims. This Court should grant certiorari and hold that no such element exists. First, the lower courts’ conclusion contradicts the deeply rooted principle that our criminal system presumes innocence and adjudicates only whether a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, because it is usually impossible to show that criminal proceedings terminated in a manner indicating innocence, the lower courts’ innocence requirement forecloses section 1983 claims for many individuals whose detention and prosecution violate their Constitutional rights. Third, the lower courts’ conclusion that a termination indicating innocence is an element of federal constitutional claims contradicts many of this Court’s cases.

Brief of National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support Of Respondent. 

Argument: Depriving the defendant of the right to decide whether to plead guilty unconstitutionally undermines his autonomy interest. The decision to plead guilty is entrusted to the defendant alone and thus implicates his fundamental autonomy interest. The requirement that a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary safeguards the defendant’s autonomy interest. The failure to inform the defendant of each element of the offense to which he is pleading guilty requires vacatur of the plea. Permitting the court to impose punishment based on hypothetical guilty pleas would be a dangerous constitutional innovation. Given that the Framers’ vision of a system of jury trials has already been displaced by pleas, the Court should not accept anything less than informed and voluntary pleas. 

Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of the Respondent.

Argument:  Administrative proceedings do not guarantee participants the assistance of counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and various other protections that apply in a criminal trial.  For these reasons, administrative proceedings do not typically preclude parties from relitigating any fact decided in the agency hearing at a subsequent criminal trial. The government’s prosecution of a noncitizen for unlawful reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 is a notable departure from this general rule.  Due process requires that § 1326 defendants be afforded some meaningful opportunity to obtain judicial review of the proceeding that is the foundation for the government’s prosecution. The Court should therefore allow Respondent to challenge the validity of his removal order in the criminal proceedings, even though he has not satisfied the requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d).

Brief of Retired Federal Judges, Former Federal Prosecutors, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner. 

Argument: Defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses under the pre-2010 version of § 841(b)(1)(C) are eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act of 2018.  The First Step Act’s resentencing provisions apply to offenses whose penalties were “modified” by the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010.  Although defendants sentenced under the pre-2010 version of § 841(b)(1)(C) remain eligible for their original sentences after the statute was recently amended, the sentences they would have received under the post-2010 version of the statute almost certainly would have been lower—likely significantly lower.  That is because the Fair Sentencing Act dramatically expanded the drug quantities to which § 841(b)(1)(C) applies.  All else equal, a sentencing judge generally aims to align the various drug-quantity ranges in § 841(b) with the corresponding sentence ranges—assigning lower sentences for lower quantities and higher sentences for higher quantities.  In other words, the drug-quantity benchmarks in § 841(b) exert a powerful anchoring influence over a judge’s sentencing decisions.  And Congress changed the relevant anchor points 2010.  Thus, it “modified” the statutory penalties in § 841(b)(1)(C), and defendants sentenced under that provision are entitled to resentencing.